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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif f·Appcllant, 
vs. 
ROYS. LUDLOW, 
Def cndant-Rcspondent. 
Case No. 
12981 
Brief of Defendant-Respondent 
STATRl\IENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff-appellant in its statement of facts 
has completed misstated or neglected to state the facts 
and issues in the instant case. 
The proffer of proof at the preliminary hearing 
made by the plaintiff and defendant showed that on 
the 22nd day of April, 1971, a deputy sheriff, Mr. Tom 
.. W orlrl, went to the manufacturing plant of Hydro-
swift Corporation to serve a small claims affidavit and 
summons upon one Gayleen Thompson, who was then 
employed by Hydroswift Corporation (R-16}. See 
78-6-3, UCA, 1953 for form of affidavit and summons. 
The defendant was the president of said corporation. 
2 
Deputv 'Vorhl was advised by defendant that sli . • . • . e was 
work.mg m the manufadurmg part of the I)laiit · . m~ 
area of volatile substances which were critical as to 
their nature and that she could not come to the adn · ' 
lIO· 
istrative offices at that time to be served (R-17). The 
plant consist of three separate buildings including the 
administrative building. l\Ir. Ludlow stated that he 
woulcl bring her up either at break time or after work 
so she could be sen·ed in the offices (ll-17). l\Ir. World 
insisted that he would go back into the plant to sel'\'e 
the papers then and there and .l\Ir. Ludlow advised him 
that he could not go back into the plant as no one was 
permitted in that area in which she was working other 
than authorized personnel ( R-17) . Deputy 'V orlcl being 
denied access to the manufacturing portion of the plant 
statecl that he would be back and left. He returned the 
next day "·ith a warrant of arrest charging the defendant 
with the indictable misdemeanor of obstructing an offi. 
cer in the discharge of his duty in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 28, Section 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to-
wit: 
"That said John Doe aka l\Ir. Ludlow 
did then and there ref use to permit the said 
deputy sheriff on the premises for the purpose 
of serving civil process." (R-16) 
Plaintiff-appellant for the first time upon appeal 
after no less than three hearings on this case raises the 
point that it was the duty of the defendant to "produce" 
3 
the person to he served to the deputy sheriff and this is 
the obstruction or resisting of which defendant is charged 
with. This is totally adverse with the argument raised 
previously hy the plaintiff. Mr. Sawaya, the Deputy 
County Attorney argued solely the denial of the right 
of entry into private property as a violation of the law 
(R-139, lines 23-30, R-140, lines 1-2). 
Plaintiff on page 5 of its brief states: 
"The defendant could have at least made 
an effort to determine ( 1) if the person whose 
name appeared on the process was indeed that 
of his employee and (2) if the employee was· 
present on the defendant's premises." 
This totally ignores the plaintiff's own proffer of proof 
where Deputy 'Vorld admitted asking if Gayleen 
Thompson was an employee and admitted that de-
fendant said she was ( R-16) and was on the premises. 
(R-16) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO STATE LAW WHICH 
REQUIRES AN EMPLOYER TO 
"PRESENT" AN EMPLOYEE TO A 
PROCESS SERVER FOR SERVICE 
OF PROCESS. 
4 
The information as filed does not alle e th· 
1 f I t f' ·1 1 g at the le ern an a1 c< to produce a JJerson for ti · 
le service of 
process by a process server but charges tJ d f 
. le e endant 
with ''then and there refused to JJermit the . 'd I ' . . . sa1 c eputy 
sherd f upon the premises for the purpose of · 
· ·1 servmg c1n process." (R-107) 
. I>Iaintiff in its argument and POINT I now re-
fm~iate5 the. al.legations of its own information upon 
winch the crnnmal action was founded. 
The State of Utah in the Bill of Particulars filed 
by it the 23rd clay of February, 1972, alleged that the 
statutory basis upon which the State of Utah relies 
which permits a deputy sheriff to enter private property 
1 
for the purposes of serving civil process to be 68-3-I, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. (R-104) 
There was no showing at the time of the prelim· 
inary hearing that defendant in any way had denied 
the deputy sheriff access into the office of the manu-
facturing company nor had ordered him out or off of 
the company property. (R-16-17) The preliminary 
hearing clearly showed that Deputy vVorld in no way 
was denied access to the office but that he was denied 
access to the manufacturing portion of the plant. (R-17· 
18) The testimony of Deputy vVorld in the proffer of 
proof made by the County Attorney was to the effect 
that the sheriff's office had been advised as to the time 
when service could be made on employees of Hydro-
swift by letter to the sheriff and that was at break time 
or after work. 
5 
The state seeks to show some statutory or legal duty 
for a party to produce another individual for the pur-
poses of hnving civil procf:'.SS served upon him upon pain 
of criminal prosecution if he fails to do so. The state 
does not cite any statutory authority for this proposi-
tion !Jut merely alleges that it relies upon the common 
law of the United States and of England. No case is 
cited nor any statutory law cited which requires a person 
to produce a third person to an officer of this state, 
without some type of writ, warrant or other legal court 
order-obviously there is none. This is actually a ludi-
crous position for the state to take inasmuch as an em-
ployer or other person has no control over a third per-
son as to whether or not he will or will not be produced 
and to require a person under the pain and penalty of 
criminal prosecution to force a third person to appear 
before a sheriff or a process server is far and beyond 
the intent of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution which did away with slavery or involuntary servi-
tude, the only conditions under which an employer could 
compel an employee to appear. Apparently the State of 
Utah now takes the position that an employer has the 
right if not the duty to compel his employees to appear 
before public officers for any purpose whatsoever that 
the public officer may have in mind. Such is not the 
law and such is not the facts of the case now before the 
Court. 
The real issue before the Court is whether or not 
the deputy sheriff, Tom W odd, had the right to enter 
6 
I 
into the man11 fad11rinµ; portion of an iIHlust :, I l \ 
. . . . . . . . 11a pan! . 
f 01 the purposes of sernng c1nl process. (R-17) Ti' 
. I I . 111 
JS t 1c so c 1ss11c that was before the committinrr . 11 
n lllaa11. , 
trntc and before the Distriet Court when it was . "'
1 
· 
, a1guer I 
by the ( m~nty A ttc!rn~y on nume1:ous occasions in repl
1 to the mot10ns to <l1sm1ss and motions to quash filed bv · 
the defendant. The State ~lf Utah is anything butcandi~ 
in its hrie f ancl in its statement to the Court of the fact 
and issues before the Court. 
POINT II 
THE L.A 'V DOES NOT ALLOW. A 
PHOCESS SERYER TO ENTER PRI-
VATE PHOPERTY TO SERVE CIVIL 
PHOCESS. 
The Slate of Utah in its llill of Particulars affirm- \ 
atiYely relied, and relied solely, upon 68-3-1, Utah Code 
1 
Annotated, 1953 as the basis for maintaining its crim· 
1 
inal prost'c11tion of the defendant in this case. The 
statute reads: 
"Cnmrnon I ,aw Adopted. The common 
law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, 
m· in conflict with, the constitutional laws of 
the U nitecl States, or the constitutional Jaws of 
this state, and so far only as it is consistent 
with and adopted to the natural and physical 
conditions of this state and the necessities of 
7 
the people hereof is hereby adopted and shall 
be the rule of decision in all courts of this 
state." 
It is sn bmitted that this particular section of law 
has no applicability in the instant case as the common 
Jaw of England is repugnant to and in conflict with 
the Constitution of the United States and the case law 
of the United States and of the State of Utah. 
No statutory law or rule or practice gives a sheriff 
the right to enter private property to serve process on 
a thinl person. See 17-22-2 UCA, 1953, Rule 4 URCP. 
The leading case as tf1 what the common law of 
England was is found in a case decided in 1604, 
Scmayne's Case, 5 Coke !H(a), 77 ENG. Reprint, 194, 
11 EXG. RUL. CAS. 628 (see footnote 5, LRA 1916 
D 282) which held that the sheriff has no right to enter 
a private dwelling except 'vith the king's writ and no 
other. 
57 ALR 210 states: 
"The common law, both in }~11gland and 
America, jealous of intrusion on domestic peace 
and security, regards every man's house as his 
castle and fortress as well for his defense 
against injury and violence, as for his repose. 
It is this ancient and well-known principle that 
underlies the whole law of the right to break 
and enter a dwelling house to serve civil writ 
8 
or proeess. AceordingJy, therefore ti 
ti . . • ie au 10nties arc substantially agree<l that, as a 
general rule, in the absence of statute, the 
outer dt>or or other outside protection to a 
dwelling house may not, even after request 
and refusal of admittance, be broken or force-
fully entered for the purpose of levying under 
a writ of execution." 
27 ALR 247 states: 
"Preliminarily it may be noted that the 
common law does not permit an officer to break 
into a dwelling ewn after he has requested 
and has heen ref used permission to enter, for 
the purpose of se1Ting a civil writ or process. 
This rule is founded on a desire to protect the 
home, and prevent injury and violence and is 
one application of the action that a man's 
home is his castle." 
To the same effect see 42 Al\I .JUR 34, Process, § 38. 
The State, in its argument, would adopt the rule 
that a man's place of business does not have the same 
protections that his home does. This construction of the 
law is in direct conflict with the rulings of the Supreme 
Court of the United States and of cases decided hy this 
Court in conformity with the mandates of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. In the case of .Mancusi v. 
DcJ?ortc, 392 U.S. 364, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154, 88 S.Ct. 2120 
(19u8) the Supreme Court stated: 
"This Court has held that the word 'houses' 
as it appears in the amendment (Fourth 
Amendment, U.S. C~nstitution) is not to be 
taken literally, and that the protection of the 
amendment may extend to commercial prem-. ,, 
1ses. 
In the case of See v. Seattle, 387 U.S .. 541, 18 
L.E<l.2d D43, 87 S .. Ct. 1737, it is stated: 
"The businessman, like the occupant of a 
residence, has a constitutional right to go about 
his business free from unreasonable official · 
entries upon his private commercial property. 
* * * "\Ve therefore conclude that administra-
tive entry, without consent, upon the portions 
of commercial premises which are not open to 
the public, may only be compelled through 
prosecution of physical force within the 
framework of a warrant procedure." 
See also Ca11iara v. ftlunicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 18 
L.Ed.2d 930, 87 S.Ct. 1727. 
POINT III 
THE C 0 N D U C T OF DEPUTY 
SHERIFF \VORLD CONSTITUTED 
AN INVASION OF PRIVACY AND 
AN ATTEMPTED SEARCH WITHIN 
10 
THE l\IEANING OF THE FOURTH 
1\l\lEXDl\IENT TO THE· CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The attempt of deputy sheriff \Vorld to enter 
into the l'onfines of the manufacturing portion of th 
. 1 . e 
llH ustnal plant constituted a search within the meanin(I 
of the prnhihilions of the Fourth Amendment to th: 
Constitution of the United States. 
The Constitution of the United States provides in 
the Fourth Amendment thereto: 
"The right of the people to he secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizmes 
shall not he violated and no one shall issue, but 
upon probably cause supported by oath or af-
firmation and particularly describing the place 
to he seard1ecl and the persons or things to be 
seized." 
To the same effect see Article I, Section 14 of the ' 
Constitution of Utah. As stated previously in Illancusi 
t'. Dc/i'ortc, supra, the word "houses" in the Fourth 
.Amendment is not to be taken literally but includes 
within the protections of the amendment commercial 
prerrnses. 
The prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go to 
the protection of one's right to be free from unwanted 
government intrusions into one's privacy. 
11 
'l'I " t " 1e proper y concept as opposed to the "pro-
tedion of privacy" has been laid to rest by the Supreme 
Court in the case of TVard1m, 1ll aryland Penitentiary vs. 
Hawlcn, H87 U.S. 294, 18 L.Ed.2d 782, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 
wherein the Supreme Court stated: 
"Searches and seizures may be 'unreason-
a hlc' within the Fourth Amendment even 
though the government asserts a superior 
property interest at common law. 'Ve have 
recognized that the principal object of the 
Fourth Amendment is the protection of pri-
vacy rather than property, and have increas- · 
ingly disregarded fictional and procedural 
harriers reste<l on property concepts." 
That the Fourth Amen<lment is applicable to the 
states has been decided in 11lapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
G L.Ecl.2<1. 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684. 
The doctrine of "unwarranted governmental in-
trusion" has been increasingly asserted by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Hoffa v. United States, 
385 U.S. 293, 17 L.E<l.2d 374, 87 S.Ct. 408. As stated 
in the case of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 577, 22 
L.Ed.2d. 542, 89 S.Ct. 1243: 
"F'or also fundamental is the right to be 
free, except in very limited circumstances, 
from unwanted government intrusions into 
' . " one s pnvacy. 
12 
See to the same effect, Camara v. lJlunicipal Court 
supra, Sec ·u. Seattle, supra, Katz v. ·U.S., 389 U.S. 347' 
19 L.Ecl.2d. 576, 88 S.Ct. 507, Johnson v. U.S., 33~ 
U.S. 10, 92 L.Ed. 436, GS S.Ct 367. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has affirmed the Ca· 
marn and S cc rationale and in the case of State v. Salt 
Lake City, et al, 21 U.2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968), 
l\Ir. J usticc Callister in speaking for the majority ob-
served: 
"In Sfc v. Seattle, the Court held that the 
basic component of a reasonable search under 
the Fourth Amendment-that it is not to be 
enforced without suitable warrant procedure 
-is applicable to businesses as well as residen-
tial premises. Therefore, an entry upon com-
mercial premises not open to the public may 
only be compelled within the framework of a 
t <l " warran proce ure. 
As pointed out by l\Ir. Justice Henriod in his concur-
ring opinion: 
"If an officer is on the premises lawfully 
for one purpose he not only can, but has a 
duty to make an arrest if in his browsing 
aro~nd, he sees an offense presently being or 
having been committed." 
This reasoning is exactly the situation m the instant 
( 
I 
13 
case. The process server, a deputy sheriff, on the prem-
ises for serving of civil process could make an arrest for 
any alleged violation he c;ame across while making his 
tour of the manufacturing plant while searching out 
the whereabouts of a person whom he was seeking to 
serve civil process upon. This is within the meaning of 
what l\Ir. Justice Henriod said about police "browsing 
arouml" on the priv~te business premises without a search 
warrant. 
In writing the majority decision in Salt Lalce City 
v. Wheeler, 24 U.2<l 112, 466 P.2d 838 (1970) .M.r. 
Justice Henriod again pointed out that there was u. 
"mythicnl distinction between 'browsing' inspection and 
'bruising' search". In this case See and Camara were 
again affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. In the 
case of TVJJman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 27 L.Ed.2d 
408, \H S. Ct. 381, the United States Supreme Court 
pointed out that where one refuses to allow a search of 
premises and such refusal will result in criminal prose-
cution, such situation invokes the Canwra and See doc-
trine of unlawful search. This is the exact situation the 
defendant in this case found himself in. If he did not 
admit the deputy sheriff, he was subject to prosecution 
and if he did admit him, his right to privacy and free-
dom of governmental intrusion was violated. The con-
stitutional auarantee of the Fourth Amendment runs ~ 
both as to criminal or civil matters. U.S. v. Undetermined 
Quantities of Stimulant Drugs (D.C. Fla., 1968), 282 
F.Supp. 543; People v. Garcia, (1969) 74 Cal. Rptr. 
14 
103, 268 C.A.2d 712; Rogers v. U.S. (rnas) 
97
F
2
d 
6!H. See Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 24 U.2d 333 ' 
P .2<l 6G9, ( 1971). ' 481 
POINT IV 
TlIE UTAJI LA YV OF "\VHAT IS 
l\IEANT BY "RESIST, DELAYS OR 
OBSTRUCTS" IS VAGUE AND UN-
CERTAIN AND IS THEREBY UN. 
CONSTITUTION AL AS APPLIED 
IN THE INSTANT CASE AND VIO-
LATIVE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
U::\TDER THE FIFTH AND FOUR-
TEENTH Al\IENDl\IENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 01~ THE UNITED 
STATES. 
It is submitted that the words "resist, delays or 
obstructs" is left up to the determination of the public 
officer who claims that he was resisted, delayed or ob-
structed. '\That may be resistance to one is not necessar· 
ily resistance to another. "\Vhat may be a delay to one 
is not a delay to another, and what is an obstruction to 
one is not necessarily an obstruction to a third person. 
Consequently, this is a judgment determination of the 
public officer who seeks criminal prosecution for a vi.o-
lation of 76-28-54, UCA, 1953, as is the defendant m 
the instant case. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has had 
15 
many occasions to pass upon words of art in various 
city ordinances and state statutes which invoke criminal 
sandion where one has transgressed by action or deed 
in violation of the meani~g of a particular word. In a 
recent Supreme Court of the United States case, Coates 
v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 29 L.Ed.2d. 214, 91 S.Ct. 
1686 ( 1971) the Supreme Court in reversing a convic-
tion of the person charged with having annoyed persons 
passmg on a sidewalk observed: 
"Conduct that annoys some people does 
not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague 
not in the sense that it requires a person to · 
conform his standard, but rather in the sense 
that no standard of conduct is specified at all. 
As a result 'men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning', Connelly v. 
General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385, 
391, 70 L.Ed. 322, 382, 46 S.Ct. 126." 
It is to be noted that there is a distinction between 
a statute which is unconstitutional on its face and a 
statute which is unconstitutional as applied. In the in-
stant case, it is the contention of the defendant that 
76-28-54 is unconstitutional as applied in this case. As 
observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Shuttles-
worth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 15 L.Ed.2d. 176, 
180, 86 S.Ct. 211: 
"As so construed, we cannot say that the 
ordinance is unconstitutional, though it requires 
16 
no great feat of imagination to enYision 't 
• • • SJ Ua-
tJons m which sueh an ordinance m1' rr}1t b o e nn. 
co11stitutionall/f applied." (Emphasis added) 
In the case of Simon Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S 
347, 12 L.Ed.2d. 894, 84 S.Ct. 1697, the Supreme Cour; 
held that: 
"The constitutional requirement of defi-
niteness is vio]ated by a criminal statute that 
f'ai]s to give a person of ordinary intelligence 
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
forbidden by the statute. The underlying prin-
ciple is that no man shall be held criminally 
responsible for conduct which he could not 
reasonably understand to be proscribed." 
In the instant case the state now takes the position 
that the person has the duty to produce a third person 
for the senice of process upon him. 'Vhere in the stat· 
utes of Utah is such conduct required? 'Vhere within 
the meaning of 76-~8-54 can one of "reasonable intelli· 
gence" determine that his failure to produce a third 
person for service of process upon him is a violation of 
the laws of Utah? In the authoritative work of Lawyers 
Edition, following the rendition of the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Ashton v. Ken· 
tucky, 384 U.S. 195, 16 L.Ed.2d. 469, 86 S.Ct. 1407 
(I 9G6), an annotation dealing with "indefiniteness of 
penal laws", found at page 1233 of 16 L.Ed.2d. states: 
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"The rc<1uirement that crimes be defined 
with appropriate <lefiniteness, which has been 
referred to as a fun<lamental common law con-
cept, is now generally hel<l to be an essential 
element of <lue process of law. The constitu-
timia] requirement of definiteness is violated 
by a criminal enactment that fails to give a 
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that 
his contemplated con<luct is forbidden by the 
statute. 'Vhile this rule has been expressed in 
rnrying lanf.,ruage, the underlying principle is 
that no man shall be held criminally responsible. 
for conduct which he could not reasonably un-
derstand to he proscribed. The vice of vague-
ness in criminal statutes is the treachery they 
conceal either in determining what persons are 
included or what acts are prohibited. A gen-
erally worded statute which is construed to 
punish conduct which cannot constitutionally 
be punished is unconstitutionally vague to the 
extent that it fails to give adequate warning 
of the boundary bebveen the constitutionally 
permissible and constitutionally impermissible 
applications of the statute. Inexplicably con-
tradictory commands in statutes ordaining 
criminal penalties are judicially denied the 
force of criminal sanction." 
"Reasonable certainty in criminal enactments 
is all the more essential when vagueness might 
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induce in<livi<luals to forego their rights of 
speceh, press an<l association for fear of violat-
ing an unclear law." 
' 
In the case of Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. \ 
399, 15 L.Ed.2d. 477, 86 S.Ct. 518 ( 1965) it was point. I 
ed out that a statute fails to meet the requirements of 
the due process clause of the Constitution of the United 
States if its so vague ancl standardless that it leaves 
the public uneertain as to the conduct it prohibits or · 
leaves judges and jurors free to deci<le, without any 
legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is 
not. See also Unit cd States 'L'. National Dairy Products 
Corporation, a72 U.S. 29, 9 L.Ed.2d. 561, 83 S.Ct. 594 
( HHi3); Scull v. Virginia, 3irn U.S. 344, 3 L.Ed.2d. 865, 
79 S.Ct. 8!38 ( 1959) ; United States v. Five Gambling 
Dct·ices, 346 U.S. 441, 98 L.E<l. 179, 74 S.Ct. 190 
( 1953). Perhaps the latest case speaking on the subject 
is that of Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 29 
L.Ed.2d. 98, 91 S.Ct. 1563 ( 1971) wherein the Supreme 
Court in quoting from U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 
98 L.Ed. 989, 7 4 S.Ct. 808 ( 1954) said: 
"The un<lerlying principle is that no man 
shall he held criminally responsible for conduct 
which he could not reasonably understand to 
be proscribt;d." 
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized the 
doctrines as announced by the Supreme Court of the 
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United States. In the case of Ringwood v. State, s 
U.2<l 287, 3:J3 P.2d 943, the Supreme Court stated: 
"\i\T e remain aware of the requirements of 
our law that our statutes are to be given a 
liberal interpretation to effectuate their pur-
poses. That having been said, however, it must 
also he recognized that where a statute charges 
one with a duty or imposes a burden or penalty, 
it must do so with sufficient clarity and defi-
niteness that one of ordinary intelligence will 
urnlerstand what he is required to do. And in 
case of alernative choices, he can comply by · 
selecting the one which is the least burdensome 
or least offensive to him." 
See also State v. Packard, 122 U. 369, 250 P.2d 561 
(1952); Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 U.2d 67, 305 P.2d 
870 (1957); llcnry v. Rocky JYlountain Packing Cor· 
poration, 113 U. 444, 202 P.2d 727, wherein the Su-
preme Court observed: 
"It is a principle too familiar to require 
citation of authority, that penal statutes, to be 
constitutional, must be clear and definite in 
their terms so that there may be known exactly 
what conduct is proscribed." 
See also 11lusser v. State of Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 92 L.Ed. 
562, 68 S.Ct. 397, wherein the Supreme Court of the 
United States in striking down a Utah law stated: 
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"Statutes defining crimes may fail of their 
purpose if they do not provide some reason-
~1hle. st:mdards of guilt." (Citing cases) "Leg-
islation may run a foul of the due process 
clause because it fails to give adequate guid-
ance to those who would he law abiding, to 
advise defendants of the nature of the offense 
with which they are charged or to guide courts 
in trying those who are accused." 
The statute as applied in the instant case violates 
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court 
did not err in quashing the information against the de· 
fendant. 
The state offered no authority for the proposition 
that a deputy sheriff has the right to enter the private 
domain of a person to sen'e civil process on another, 
which contradicted or distinguished the mandates of 
Camara and Sec. 
The State in its brief on appeal has offered no 
authority for the proposition that it is the legal duty 
for an employer to produce his employee for a public 
official, and his failure so to do will subject him to 
criminal prosecution. 
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It is submitted that the trial court should have 
niled upon the constitutional issues raised by defendant, 
that is the unlawful sear~h under the Fourth Amend-
ment and the vague and uncertainity of 76-28-54, UCA, 
1953, making it unconstitutional as applied. Defendant 
now requests this court to rule upon the unconstitu-
tionality of the conduct of Deputy World, and upon 
the unconstitutionality of 76-28-54, UCA, 1953. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
Attorney for Defendant· 
Respondent 
